基于溫度特征分析的硬件木馬檢測(cè)方法

鐘晶鑫; 王建業(yè); 闞保強(qiáng)

doi:10.11999/JEIT170443

基于溫度特征分析的硬件木馬檢測(cè)方法

doi: 10.11999/JEIT170443

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出版歷程
- 收稿日期: 2017-05-11
- 修回日期: 2017-09-18
- 刊出日期: 2018-03-19

Hardware Trojan Detection Through Temperature Characteristics Analysis

摘要

摘要: 硬件木馬是一種在特定條件下使集成電路失效或泄露機(jī)密信息等的惡意電路，給現(xiàn)代信息系統(tǒng)帶來(lái)了嚴(yán)重的安全隱患。該文基于硬件木馬在芯片工作之初造成的溫度響應(yīng)特征，提出一種利用芯片溫度變化特性并進(jìn)行比對(duì)的硬件木馬檢測(cè)方法。該方法采用環(huán)形振蕩器作為片內(nèi)溫度特征測(cè)量傳感器，提取溫度變化特征信息，并采用曲線擬合評(píng)價(jià)指標(biāo)來(lái)評(píng)估硬件木馬對(duì)溫度變化特征的影響，通過(guò)比對(duì)無(wú)木馬芯片溫度響應(yīng)特征從而完成木馬檢測(cè)。通過(guò)對(duì)10個(gè)不同芯片的檢測(cè)，結(jié)果表明該方法能夠?qū)γ娣e消耗32個(gè)邏輯單元硬件木馬的檢測(cè)率達(dá)到100%，對(duì)16個(gè)邏輯單元檢測(cè)概率也能達(dá)到90%；同時(shí)檢測(cè)結(jié)果表明該方法完成硬件木馬檢測(cè)后，能夠?qū)τ布抉R的植入位置進(jìn)行粗定位。
- 硬件木馬 /
- 溫度變化 /
- 環(huán)形振蕩器 /
- 檢測(cè)定位
Abstract: Hardware Trojan is the malicious circuit modification which can disable the Integrated Circuit (IC) or leak confidential information covertly to the adversary, and brings potential safety hazard for ICs. In this paper, a new approach for hardware Trojan detection based on compare the temperature variation characteristics when IC starts working. Ring Oscillator (RO) is used as a detector to obtain the information about ICs temperature variation characteristics. In order to describe temperature variation characteristics accuracy, a parameter about the D-value of ROs oscillation cycle counts is presented, and parameters about the quality of the fitting curve are used to estimate the hardware Trojans effect on ICs temperature characteristics. Results from ten chips show that the proposed approach is effective towards increasing successful detection ratio and can achieve better Trojan detection probability 100% on average over conventional patterns for Trojan which is 32 logic elements, and for Trojan which is 16 logic elements can also achieve Trojan detection probability 90%, besides the proposed approach locating the Trojans insertion place roughly.
- Hardware Trojan /
- Temperature variation /
- Ring Oscillator (RO) /
- Detection and location

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