基于Lowe分類法的5G網(wǎng)絡(luò)EAP-AKA<inline-formula><tex-math id="Z-20190723051620-1">\begin{document}$ ' $\end{document}</tex-math><alternatives><graphic xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="190063_Z-20190723051620-1.jpg"></graphic><graphic xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="190063_Z-20190723051620-1.png"></graphic></alternatives></inline-formula>協(xié)議安全性分析

劉彩霞; 胡鑫鑫; 劉樹新; 游偉; 趙宇

doi:10.11999/JEIT190063

基于Lowe分類法的5G網(wǎng)絡(luò)EAP-AKA$ ' $協(xié)議安全性分析

doi: 10.11999/JEIT190063

國(guó)家數(shù)字交換系統(tǒng)工程技術(shù)研究中心 ??鄭州 ??450002

基金項(xiàng)目: 國(guó)家自然科學(xué)創(chuàng)新研究群體基金(61521003)，國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金(61801515)

詳細(xì)信息

作者簡(jiǎn)介:
劉彩霞：女，1974年生，教授，博士生導(dǎo)師，研究方向?yàn)橐苿?dòng)通信網(wǎng)絡(luò)、新型網(wǎng)絡(luò)體系結(jié)構(gòu)

胡鑫鑫：男，1994年生，碩士生，研究方向?yàn)?G 網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全、新一代移動(dòng)通信技術(shù)

劉樹新：男，1987年生，博士，講師，研究方向?yàn)閺?fù)雜網(wǎng)絡(luò)、網(wǎng)絡(luò)信息挖掘

游偉：男，1984年生，博士，講師，研究方向?yàn)槊艽a學(xué)、移動(dòng)通信網(wǎng)絡(luò)

趙宇：男，1984年生，博士，講師，研究方向?yàn)橐苿?dòng)通信網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全、新型網(wǎng)絡(luò)體系結(jié)構(gòu)

通訊作者:
胡鑫鑫　justinhu@hust.edu.cn

中圖分類號(hào): TP309
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- 文章訪問數(shù): 3605
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出版歷程
- 收稿日期: 2019-01-23
- 修回日期: 2019-05-19
- 網(wǎng)絡(luò)出版日期: 2019-05-27
- 刊出日期: 2019-08-01

Security Analysis of 5G Network EAP-AKA′ Protocol Based on Lowe’s Taxonomy

National Digital Switching System Engineering & Technological R&D Center, Zhengzhou 450002, China

Funds: The National Natural Science Fund for Innovative Research Groups (61521003), The National Natural Science Foundation of China (61801515)

摘要

摘要: 移動(dòng)網(wǎng)鑒權(quán)認(rèn)證協(xié)議攻擊不斷涌現(xiàn)，針對(duì)5G網(wǎng)絡(luò)新協(xié)議EAP-AKA$ '$，該文提出一種基于Lowe分類法的EAP-AKA$ '$安全性分析模型。首先對(duì)5G網(wǎng)絡(luò)協(xié)議EAP-AKA$ '$、信道及攻擊者進(jìn)行形式化建模。然后對(duì)Lowe鑒權(quán)性質(zhì)進(jìn)行形式化描述，利用TAMARIN證明器分析協(xié)議中安全錨點(diǎn)密鑰K_SEAF的Lowe鑒權(quán)性質(zhì)、完美前向保密性、機(jī)密性等安全目標(biāo)，發(fā)現(xiàn)了3GPP隱式鑒權(quán)方式下的4條攻擊路徑。最后針對(duì)發(fā)現(xiàn)的安全問題提出2種改進(jìn)方案并驗(yàn)證其有效性，并將5G網(wǎng)絡(luò)兩種鑒權(quán)協(xié)議EAP-AKA$ '$和5G AKA的安全性進(jìn)行了對(duì)比，發(fā)現(xiàn)前者在Lowe鑒權(quán)性質(zhì)方面更安全。
- 網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全 /
- 安全錨點(diǎn)密鑰 /
- EAP-AKA$ '$ /
- Lowe分類法 /
- Dolev-Yao敵手模型 /
- TAMARIN
Abstract: Mobile network authentication protocol attacks continue to emerge. For the new 5G network protocol EAP-AKA', an EAP-AKA' security analysis method based on Lowe’s taxonomy is proposed. Firstly, 5G network, EAP-AKA', communication channel and adversary are formally modeled. Then Lowe authentication property is formally modeled. Using the TAMARIN prover, objectives of the security anchor key K_SEAF are analyzed, such as Lowe’s taxonomy, perfect forward secrecy, confidentiality, etc. Four attack paths under 3GPP implicit authentication mode are discovered. Two improved schemes are proposed for the discovered security problems and their security is verified. Finally, the security of the two authentication protocols EAP-AKA’ and 5G AKA of the 5G network is compared, and it is found that the former is safer in terms of Lowe authentication property.
- Network security /
- Security anchor key /
- EAP-AKA$ '$ /
- Lowe’s taxonomy /
- Dolev-Yao adversary model /
- TAMARIN

HTML全文

圖 1 5G網(wǎng)絡(luò)漫游場(chǎng)景下的信任模型

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圖 2 5G網(wǎng)絡(luò)EAP-AKA’協(xié)議鑒權(quán)流程

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圖 3 基于Lowe分類法的EAP-AKA$ ' $協(xié)議安全分析模型

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圖 4 安全目標(biāo)形式化描述

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圖 5 TAMARIN證明器工作原理

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圖 6 兩種改進(jìn)方案

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表 1 符號(hào)說(shuō)明

符號(hào)	定義
Create(A, id, R)	對(duì)編號(hào)為id的角色A創(chuàng)建一個(gè)事件
Claim_type(A, t)	角色A在時(shí)刻t聲明一個(gè)事件
Honest(A)	角色A不被攻擊者感染
Reveal(A)	角色A被攻擊者感染
K(t)	攻擊者獲取了傳遞的信息
F@i	在時(shí)刻i發(fā)生事件F
#i<#j	時(shí)刻i早于時(shí)刻j
#i=#j	時(shí)刻i與時(shí)刻j相同
x=y	消息變量x, y相等

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表 2 用spthy語(yǔ)言描述協(xié)議狀態(tài)轉(zhuǎn)移

　rule SN_1send:

　let m = ‘Identity Request’

　in [ St_SN_0($SN, ～id, $HN, SK) ]

　--[ Send($SN, m)]->

　[ Out(m), St_SN_1($SN, ～id, $HN, SK)]

下載: 導(dǎo)出CSV

表 3 隱式鑒權(quán)和顯式鑒權(quán)對(duì)比(對(duì)K_SEAF的機(jī)密性、完美前向保密性)

協(xié)議參與方	UE		SN		HN
	隱式	顯式	隱式	顯式	隱式	顯式
K_SEAF機(jī)密性	√	√	√	√	√	√
K_SEAF完美前向保密性	×	×	×	×	×	×

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表 4 EAP-AKA$ '$和5G AKA對(duì)比(隱式鑒權(quán))

協(xié)議參與方	UE對(duì)SN		UE對(duì)HN		SN對(duì)UE		HN對(duì)UE
	EAP-AKA′	5G AKA	EAP-AKA′	5G AKA	EAP-AKA′	5G AKA	EAP-AKA′	5G AKA
存活性	√	×	√	√	√	√	√	√
弱一致性	√	×	√	√	√	×	√	√
非單射一致性	×	×	√	×	√	×	√	×
單射一致性	×	×	√	×	√	×	√	×

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表 5 EAP-AKA$ '$和5G AKA對(duì)比(顯式鑒權(quán))

協(xié)議參與方	UE對(duì)SN		UE對(duì)HN		SN對(duì)UE		HN對(duì)UE
	EAP-AKA′	5G AKA	EAP-AKA′	5G AKA	EAP-AKA′	5G AKA	EAP-AKA′	5G AKA
存活性	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
弱一致性	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
非單射一致性	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	×
單射一致性	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	×

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表 6 改進(jìn)MAC計(jì)算方式

　MAC=f₁(K, <SQN_HN, R, SNN >)

　故AUTN=<CONC, f₁(K, MAC)>

　　　　　=< SQN_HN⊕AK, f₁(K, <SQN_HN, R, SNN >)>

　　　　　=< SQN_HN⊕f₅(K, R), f₁(K, <SQN_HN, R, SNN >)>

　　　　　=KDF_AUTN(SQN_HN, K, R, SNN)

下載: 導(dǎo)出CSV

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