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LiCi分組密碼算法的不可能差分分析

韋永壯 史佳利 李靈琛

韋永壯, 史佳利, 李靈琛. LiCi分組密碼算法的不可能差分分析[J]. 電子與信息學(xué)報(bào), 2019, 41(7): 1610-1617. doi: 10.11999/JEIT180729
引用本文: 韋永壯, 史佳利, 李靈琛. LiCi分組密碼算法的不可能差分分析[J]. 電子與信息學(xué)報(bào), 2019, 41(7): 1610-1617. doi: 10.11999/JEIT180729
Yongzhuang WEI, Jiali SHI, Lingchen LI. Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of LiCi Block Cipher[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2019, 41(7): 1610-1617. doi: 10.11999/JEIT180729
Citation: Yongzhuang WEI, Jiali SHI, Lingchen LI. Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of LiCi Block Cipher[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2019, 41(7): 1610-1617. doi: 10.11999/JEIT180729

LiCi分組密碼算法的不可能差分分析

doi: 10.11999/JEIT180729
基金項(xiàng)目: 國家自然科學(xué)基金(61572148, 61872103, 61561016), 廣西研究生教育創(chuàng)新計(jì)劃資助項(xiàng)目(YCBZ2018051), 獲桂林電子科技大學(xué)研究生優(yōu)秀學(xué)位論文培育項(xiàng)目(16YJPYSS12), 桂林電子科技大學(xué)研究生教育創(chuàng)新計(jì)劃(2018YJCX45)
詳細(xì)信息
    作者簡(jiǎn)介:

    韋永壯:男,1976年生,教授,博士生導(dǎo)師,研究方向?yàn)槊艽a函數(shù)、分組密碼分析

    史佳利:女,1992年生,碩士生,研究方向?yàn)閷?duì)稱密碼算法分析

    李靈?。号?,1988年生,博士生,研究方向?yàn)榉纸M密碼的分析與設(shè)計(jì)

    通訊作者:

    史佳利 jiali00@126.com

  • 中圖分類號(hào): TP309

Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of LiCi Block Cipher

Funds: The National Natural Science Foundation of China (61572148, 61872103, 61561016), The Innovation Project of Guangxi Graduate Education (YCBZ2018051), Guilin University of Electrionic Technology Excellent Graduate Thesis Program (16YJPYSS12), The Innovation Project of Guilin University of Electrionic Technology Graduate Education (2018YJCX45)
  • 摘要: LiCi是由Patil等人(2017)提出的輕量級(jí)分組密碼算法。由于采用新型的設(shè)計(jì)理念,該算法具有結(jié)構(gòu)緊湊、能耗低、占用芯片面積小等優(yōu)點(diǎn),特別適用于資源受限的環(huán)境。目前該算法的安全性備受關(guān)注,Patil等人聲稱:16輪簡(jiǎn)化算法足以抵抗經(jīng)典的差分攻擊及線性攻擊。該文基于S盒的差分特征,結(jié)合中間相遇思想,構(gòu)造了一個(gè)10輪的不可能差分區(qū)分器?;诖藚^(qū)分器,向前后各擴(kuò)展3輪,并利用密鑰編排方案,給出了LiCi的一個(gè)16輪的不可能差分分析方法。該攻擊需要時(shí)間復(fù)雜度約為283.08次16輪加密,數(shù)據(jù)復(fù)雜度約為259.76選擇明文,存儲(chǔ)復(fù)雜度約為276.76數(shù)據(jù)塊,這說明16輪簡(jiǎn)化的LiCi算法無法抵抗不可能差分攻擊。
  • 圖  1  LiCi算法的輪函數(shù)

    圖  2  LiCi算法的10輪不可能差分路線

    圖  3  LiCi算法的16輪不可能差分分析

    表  1  S盒輸入/輸出差分特征

    輸入差分00010100100011001101**11**1***0****1***0
    輸出差分1******1***11**00***00010010001101000101
    下載: 導(dǎo)出CSV

    表  2  S盒輸入/輸出差分特征概率

    輸入差分**11**1****1****00010****0**01***000
    輸出差分00010010010010001*******************
    概率1/41/81/81/161/81/21/21/41/8
    下載: 導(dǎo)出CSV

    表  3  不可能差分分析16輪LiCi算法的密鑰恢復(fù)各步驟的時(shí)間復(fù)雜度

    步驟恢復(fù)的密鑰比特猜測(cè)比特?cái)?shù)目時(shí)間復(fù)雜度(單位:次16輪加密所用的時(shí)間)
    (1)0${2^{m + 49}} \times \frac{1}{{8 \times 16}} = {2^{{{m}} + 42}}$
    (2)${\rm{Rk}}{0_1}\left[ {24 \sim 21} \right]$4${2^{m + 21}} \times {2^4} \times \frac{1}{{8 \times 16}} = {2^{{{m}} + 18}}$
    (3)${\rm{Rk}}{15_2}\left[ {15 \sim 12} \right]$4${2^{m + 18}} \times {2^4} \times {2^4} \times \frac{1}{{8 \times 16}} = {2^{{{m}} + 19}}$
    (4)${\rm{Rk}}{15_2}\left[ {31 \sim 28} \right]$4${2^{m + 15}} \times {2^4} \times {2^4} \times {2^4} \times \frac{1}{{8 \times 16}} = {2^{{{m}} + 20}}$
    (5)${\rm{Rk}}{15_2}\left[ {23 \sim 20} \right]$4${2^{m + 14}} \times {2^4} \times {2^4} \times {2^4} \times {2^4} \times \frac{1}{{8 \times 16}} = {2^{{{m}} + 23}}$
    (6)${\rm{Rk}}{15_1}\left[ {16 \sim 13} \right]$, ${\rm{Rk}}{14_2}\left[ {23 \sim 20} \right]$8${2^{m + 13}} \times {2^4} \times {2^4} \times {2^4} \times {2^4} \times {2^8} \times \frac{1}{{8 \times 16}} = {2^{{{m}} + 30}}$
    (7)${\rm{Rk}}{15_2}\left[ {19 \sim 16,11 \sim 9} \right]$, ${\rm{Rk}}{15_1}\left[ {12 \sim 9} \right]$, ${\rm{Rk}}{14_2}\left[ {19 \sim 16} \right]$12${2^{m + 10}} \times {2^{16}} \times {2^8} \times {2^{12}} \times 2 \times \frac{1}{{8 \times 16}} = {2^{{{m}} + 40}}$
    (8)${\rm{Rk}}{15_2}\left[ {27 \sim 24} \right]$, ${\rm{Rk}}{15_1}\left[ {20 \sim 17} \right]$, ${\rm{Rk}}{14_2}\left[ {27 \sim 24} \right]$12${2^{m + 7}} \times {2^{24}} \times {2^{12}} \times {2^{12}} \times 2 \times \frac{1}{{8 \times 16}} = {2^{{{m}} + 49}}$
    (9)${\rm{Rk}}{15_2}\left[ {8 \sim 6} \right]$, ${\rm{Rk}}{15_1}\left[ {8 \sim 6} \right]$, ${\rm{Rk}}{15_2}\left[ {15 \sim 13} \right]$, ${\rm{Rk}}{14_1}\left[ {16 \sim 13} \right]$10${2^{m + 5}} \times {2^{24}} \times {2^{12}} \times {2^{12}} \times {2^{10}} \times 2 \times \frac{1}{{8 \times 16}} = {2^{{{m}} + 56}}$
    (10)${\rm{Rk}}{0_1}\left[ {20 \sim 9} \right]$, ${\rm{Rk}}{0_2}\left[ {23 \sim 20} \right]$, ${\rm{Rk}}{1_1}\left[ {16 \sim 13} \right]$20${2^{m{\rm{ - }}16}} \times {2^{58}} \times {2^{20}} \times 3 \times \frac{1}{{8 \times 16}} + {2^{74}} = {2^{{{m}} + 56.58}} + {2^{74}}$
    下載: 導(dǎo)出CSV

    表  4  LiCi算法的攻擊結(jié)果對(duì)比

    分析方法攻擊輪數(shù)選擇明文量時(shí)間復(fù)雜度存儲(chǔ)復(fù)雜度參考文獻(xiàn)
    線性分析162106文獻(xiàn)[10]
    差分分析16296文獻(xiàn)[10]
    不可能差分分析16259.76283.08276.76本文
    下載: 導(dǎo)出CSV
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  • 收稿日期:  2018-07-19
  • 修回日期:  2018-10-29
  • 網(wǎng)絡(luò)出版日期:  2019-03-18
  • 刊出日期:  2019-07-01

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