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一種面向粗粒度可重構(gòu)陣列的硬件木馬檢測(cè)算法的設(shè)計(jì)與實(shí)現(xiàn)

嚴(yán)迎建 劉敏 邱釗洋

嚴(yán)迎建, 劉敏, 邱釗洋. 一種面向粗粒度可重構(gòu)陣列的硬件木馬檢測(cè)算法的設(shè)計(jì)與實(shí)現(xiàn)[J]. 電子與信息學(xué)報(bào), 2019, 41(5): 1257-1264. doi: 10.11999/JEIT180484
引用本文: 嚴(yán)迎建, 劉敏, 邱釗洋. 一種面向粗粒度可重構(gòu)陣列的硬件木馬檢測(cè)算法的設(shè)計(jì)與實(shí)現(xiàn)[J]. 電子與信息學(xué)報(bào), 2019, 41(5): 1257-1264. doi: 10.11999/JEIT180484
Yingjian YAN, Min LIU, Zhaoyang QIU. Design and Implementation of Hardware Trojan Detection Algorithm for Coarse-grained Reconfigurable Arrays[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2019, 41(5): 1257-1264. doi: 10.11999/JEIT180484
Citation: Yingjian YAN, Min LIU, Zhaoyang QIU. Design and Implementation of Hardware Trojan Detection Algorithm for Coarse-grained Reconfigurable Arrays[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2019, 41(5): 1257-1264. doi: 10.11999/JEIT180484

一種面向粗粒度可重構(gòu)陣列的硬件木馬檢測(cè)算法的設(shè)計(jì)與實(shí)現(xiàn)

doi: 10.11999/JEIT180484
詳細(xì)信息
    作者簡(jiǎn)介:

    嚴(yán)迎建:男,1973 年生,教授,研究方向?yàn)榘踩珜?zhuān)用芯片設(shè)計(jì)技術(shù)

    劉敏:女,1995年生,碩士生,研究方向?yàn)榘踩珜?zhuān)用芯片設(shè)計(jì)技術(shù)硬件木馬檢測(cè)

    邱釗洋:男,1991年生,博士生,研究方向?yàn)樾盘?hào)分析與軟件無(wú)線(xiàn)電

    通訊作者:

    劉敏 15515671017@163.com

  • 中圖分類(lèi)號(hào): TN406

Design and Implementation of Hardware Trojan Detection Algorithm for Coarse-grained Reconfigurable Arrays

  • 摘要: 硬件木馬檢測(cè)已成為當(dāng)前芯片安全領(lǐng)域的研究熱點(diǎn),現(xiàn)有檢測(cè)算法大多面向ASIC電路和FPGA電路,且依賴(lài)于未感染硬件木馬的黃金芯片,難以適應(yīng)于由大規(guī)??芍貥?gòu)單元組成的粗粒度可重構(gòu)陣列電路。因此,該文針對(duì)粗粒度可重構(gòu)密碼陣列的結(jié)構(gòu)特點(diǎn),提出基于分區(qū)和多變體邏輯指紋的硬件木馬檢測(cè)算法。該算法將電路劃分為多個(gè)區(qū)域,采用邏輯指紋特征作為區(qū)域的標(biāo)識(shí)符,通過(guò)在時(shí)空兩個(gè)維度上比較分區(qū)的多變體邏輯指紋,實(shí)現(xiàn)了無(wú)黃金芯片的硬件木馬檢測(cè)和診斷。實(shí)驗(yàn)結(jié)果表明,所提檢測(cè)算法對(duì)硬件木馬檢測(cè)有較高的檢測(cè)成功率和較低的誤判率。
  • 圖  1  粗粒度可重構(gòu)密碼陣列硬件結(jié)構(gòu)

    圖  2  不同觸發(fā)信號(hào)的硬件木馬示意

    圖  3  CGRCA電路分區(qū)示意

    圖  4  邏輯指紋檢測(cè)原理

    圖  5  子任務(wù)不同變體執(zhí)行實(shí)例

    圖  6  不同區(qū)域?qū)Ρ仁疽?/p>

    圖  7  算法檢測(cè)流程示意圖

    圖  8  硬件木馬設(shè)計(jì)示意圖

    圖  9  不同檢測(cè)算法結(jié)果對(duì)比

    表  1  檢測(cè)結(jié)果可能情況

    實(shí)際情況檢測(cè)情況
    不含硬件木馬含有硬件木馬
    不含硬件木馬正確錯(cuò)誤
    含有硬件木馬錯(cuò)誤正確
    下載: 導(dǎo)出CSV

    表  2  待測(cè)電路具體情況

    電路編號(hào)分區(qū)數(shù)線(xiàn)網(wǎng)數(shù)輸入輸出木馬面積占比(%)
    原始電路162604944/
    C-101626049440.015
    S-101626049440.025
    CS-5/51626049440.031
    下載: 導(dǎo)出CSV

    表  3  檢測(cè)算法實(shí)驗(yàn)結(jié)果對(duì)比(%)

    電路編號(hào)ATMR DRMaSV RLF 本文算法
    RsRfAPCORsRfAPCORsRfAPCORsRfAPCO
    C-10AES91.11.0291.3 97.20.3793.7 93.10.4552.1 97.30.3193.2
    SMS492.90.9891.797.30.3593.893.20.4154.197.70.2993.7
    A5/189.70.9989.993.50.3293.991.10.3752.794.70.3092.1
    均值91.21.0091.096.00.3593.892.50.4153.096.60.3093.0
    S-10AES89.71.1390.293.20.3993.589.60.4753.793.40.3293.3
    SMS488.51.0590.393.40.3893.990.10.4453.993.30.3192.9
    A5/185.31.0189.790.50.3393.490.20.3954.192.70.3391.7
    均值87.81.0690.192.40.3793.690.00.4353.993.10.3292.6
    CS-5/5AES90.11.0091.095.30.3993.893.00.4654.695.40.2792.1
    SMS491.30.9991.395.60.3794.092.70.4354.795.60.2793.2
    A5/189.31.0190.793.70.3593.592.30.3953.393.70.3192.7
    均值90.21.0091.094.90.3793.892.70.4354.294.90.2892.7
    均值89.81.0290.794.40.3693.791.70.4253.794.90.3092.8
    下載: 導(dǎo)出CSV
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    ZHAO Jianfeng and SHI Gang. A survey on the studies of hardware trojan[J]. Journal of Cyber Security, 2017, 2(1): 74–90. doi: 10.19363/j.cnki.cn10-1380/tn.2017.01.006
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出版歷程
  • 收稿日期:  2018-05-21
  • 修回日期:  2018-09-20
  • 網(wǎng)絡(luò)出版日期:  2018-10-22
  • 刊出日期:  2019-05-01

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