基于隨機(jī)加法鏈的高級(jí)加密標(biāo)準(zhǔn)抗側(cè)信道攻擊對(duì)策
doi: 10.11999/JEIT171211
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哈爾濱理工大學(xué)軟件與微電子學(xué)院 ??哈爾濱 ??150080
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哈爾濱理工大學(xué)計(jì)算機(jī)科學(xué)與技術(shù)學(xué)院 ??哈爾濱 ??150080
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哈爾濱理工大學(xué)理學(xué)院 ??哈爾濱 ??150080
Random Addition-chain Based Countermeasure Against Side-channel Attack for Advanced Encryption Standard
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School of Software and Microelectronics, Harbin University of Science and Technology, Harbin 150080, China
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School of Computer Sciences and Technology, Harbin University of Science and Technology, Harbin 150080, China
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School of Sciences, Harbin University of Science and Technology, Harbin 150080, China
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摘要:
側(cè)信道攻擊已經(jīng)對(duì)高級(jí)加密標(biāo)準(zhǔn)(AES)的硬件安全造成嚴(yán)重威脅,如何抵御側(cè)信道攻擊成為目前亟待解決的問(wèn)題。字節(jié)替換操作作為AES算法中唯一的非線性操作,提高其安全性對(duì)整個(gè)加密算法有重要意義。該文提出一種基于隨機(jī)加法鏈的AES抗側(cè)信道攻擊對(duì)策,該對(duì)策用隨機(jī)加法鏈代替之前固定的加法鏈來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)有限域GF(28)上的乘法求逆操作,在此基礎(chǔ)上研究隨機(jī)加法鏈對(duì)算法安全性和有效性方面的影響。實(shí)驗(yàn)表明,所提隨機(jī)加法鏈算法比之前固定的加法鏈算法在抵御側(cè)信道攻擊上更加安全、有效。
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關(guān)鍵詞:
- 高級(jí)加密標(biāo)準(zhǔn) /
- 側(cè)信道攻擊 /
- 字節(jié)替換 /
- 加法鏈
Abstract:Side channel attacks have serious threat to the hardware security of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), how to resist the side channel attack becomes an urgent problem. Byte substitution operation is the only nonlinear operation in AES algorithm, so it is very important for the whole encryption algorithm to improve its security. In this paper, a countermeasure against side-channel attack is proposed based on random addition-chain for AES by replacing the fixed addition-chain with random addition-chain to realize the inverse operation of multiplication in a finite field GF(28). The impact of the random addition-chain on the security and effectiveness of the algorithm is studied. Experimental results show that the proposed random addition-chain based algorithm is more secure and effective than the previous fixed addition-chain based algorithms in defending against side channel attacks.
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表 1 16條不同功耗特性的加法鏈
序號(hào) 加法鏈路徑 (1) 1→2→4→8→16→32→64→80→84→168→252→254 (2) 1→2→4→8→16→32→64→80→84→86→168→254 (3) 1→2→4→8→16→32→48→50→100→200→250→254 (4) 1→2→4→8→16→32→48→50→100→102→204→254 (5) 1→2→4→8→16→32→48→50→54→100→200→254 (6) 1→2→4→8→16→32→40→80→84→168→252→254 (7) 1→2→4→8→16→32→40→80→84→86→168→254 (8) 1→2→4→8→16→32→40→42→84→126→127→254 (9) 1→2→4→8→16→32→40→42→43→84→ 127→254 (10) 1→2→4→8→16→32→36→72→144→216→252→254 (11) 1→2→4→8→16→24→40→50→100→200→250→254 (12) 1→2→4→8→16→24→48→50→100→102→204→254 (13) 1→2→4→8→16→24→48→50→54→100→200→254 (14) 1→2→4→8→16→24→28→56→112→224→252→254 (15) 1→2→4→8→16→24→28→56→112→113→226→254 (16) 1→2→4→8→16→24→28→30→56→112→224→254 下載: 導(dǎo)出CSV
表 2 隨機(jī)數(shù)生成算法
將包含1~16的數(shù)組完全打亂 輸入:a[16]={1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16} 輸出:1~16隨機(jī)排列后的數(shù)組 (1)srand((unsigned)time(NULL))/*隨機(jī)數(shù)發(fā)生器的初始函數(shù)*/ (2)int i,j,temp (3)for i from 16 to 1 do /*i 從16遞減到1 */ (4)j=rand()%(i+1) /*生成0~i的隨機(jī)數(shù)*/ (5)Temp=a[j] /*交換數(shù)組中第i+1個(gè)數(shù)和第j+1個(gè)數(shù)*/ (6)a[j]=a[i] (7)a[i]=temp (8)end for 下載: 導(dǎo)出CSV
表 3 不同方案的不同模塊的面積比較
方案 組合面積(kGE) 非組合面積(kGE) 網(wǎng)絡(luò)互連面積(kGE) 總面積(kGE) 字節(jié)替換 行移位 列混合 密鑰加 密鑰擴(kuò)展 標(biāo)準(zhǔn)AES 1067 32 149 66 1190 854 46 3404 文獻(xiàn)[7]方案 2179 32 149 66 2328 675 26 5441 循環(huán)調(diào)用加法鏈 2162 32 149 66 2320 675 20 5424 亂序調(diào)用加法鏈 2165 32 149 66 2344 675 21 5452 下載: 導(dǎo)出CSV
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