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自私性移動P2P網絡中節(jié)點激勵策略研究

劉浩,  陳志剛,  張連明

劉浩, 陳志剛, 張連明. 自私性移動P2P網絡中節(jié)點激勵策略研究[J]. 電子與信息學報, 2017, 39(8): 1986-1992. doi: 10.11999/JEIT161335
引用本文: 劉浩, 陳志剛, 張連明. 自私性移動P2P網絡中節(jié)點激勵策略研究[J]. 電子與信息學報, 2017, 39(8): 1986-1992. doi: 10.11999/JEIT161335
LIU Hao, CHEN Zhigang, ZHANG Lianming. Research on Node Incentive Protocol in Selfish Mobile Peer-to-peer Network[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2017, 39(8): 1986-1992. doi: 10.11999/JEIT161335
Citation: LIU Hao, CHEN Zhigang, ZHANG Lianming. Research on Node Incentive Protocol in Selfish Mobile Peer-to-peer Network[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2017, 39(8): 1986-1992. doi: 10.11999/JEIT161335

自私性移動P2P網絡中節(jié)點激勵策略研究

doi: 10.11999/JEIT161335
  • 1.

    (湖南人文科技學院信息學院 婁底 417000) ②(中南大學信息科學與工程學院 長沙 410083) ③(湖南師范大學物理與信息科學學院 長沙 410081)

基金項目: 

國家自然科學基金(61572191, 61571188 )，湖南省自然科學基金(2017JJ2124)，湖南省教育廳優(yōu)秀青年科研項目 (15B125)，湖南省計算機應用技術重點建設學科資助項目

Research on Node Incentive Protocol in Selfish Mobile Peer-to-peer Network

  • 1.

    (Institute of Information, Hunan University of Humanities, Science and Technology, Loudi 417000, China)

  • 2.

    (School of Information Science and Engineering, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China)

Funds: 

The National Natural Science Foundation of China (61572191, 61571188), The Natural Science Foundation of Hunan Province (2017JJ2124), The Outstanding Youth Scientific Research Foundation of Department of Education, Hunan Province (15B125),　The Key Construction Course of Computer Application Technology in Hunan Province

  • 摘要: 該文針對移動P2P網絡中節(jié)點表現(xiàn)出來的自私性，并結合移動P2P網絡的資源受限、自組織以及開放性等特點，提出一種基于不完全信息的雙方叫價拍賣模型的節(jié)點激勵策略DAIP。該激勵策略采用虛擬貨幣的支付方式，節(jié)點根據(jù)其擁有的虛擬貨幣量、自身資源狀態(tài)和消息屬性對每次消息轉發(fā)進行估價，然后根據(jù)估價與博弈策略給出相應報價。通過博弈分析給出了DAIP策略的線性策略貝葉斯納什均衡解，使各節(jié)點為最大化其自身利益而積極參與消息轉發(fā)合作，從而促進網絡系統(tǒng)中消息轉發(fā)合作的成功。分析與實驗結果表明該激勵策略能夠降低系統(tǒng)的能量消耗，提高整個網絡系統(tǒng)的消息轉發(fā)成功率，提高系統(tǒng)的整體效用。
    Abstract: In view of the selfishness of nodes in mobile Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network, combined with its features of the resource-constrained, self-organization and opening, this paper proposes a novel Incentive Protocol DAIP of mobile P2P network based on Double Auction model of incomplete information on both sides. The incentive mechanism adopts virtual currency payment method. The node calculates the evaluation of a message forwarding based on the virtual currency, resource state of it and the property of message, then gives the corresponding price according to the evaluation and game strategy. Through the game analysis, the linear strategy Bayes Nash equilibrium solution of DAIP strategy is given, which makes each node to maximize its own benefits, encourages them to cooperate with the message forwarding, and then improves the success rate of message forwarding in the network system. Analysis and simulation show that this incentive mechanism is able to effectively reduce the system's energy consumption, improve the success rate of message forwarding in the whole network system, and improve the overall effectiveness of the system.
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出版歷程
  • 收稿日期:  2016-12-08
  • 修回日期:  2017-05-19
  • 刊出日期:  2017-08-19

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