基于訪問控制的Hypervisor非控制數(shù)據(jù)完整性保護(hù)

陳志鋒; 李清寶; 張平; 曾光裕

doi:10.11999/JEIT150130

基于訪問控制的Hypervisor非控制數(shù)據(jù)完整性保護(hù)

doi: 10.11999/JEIT150130

基金項(xiàng)目:

核高基國家科技重大專項(xiàng)(2013JH00103)和國家863目標(biāo)導(dǎo)向項(xiàng)目(2009AA01Z434)

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- 文章訪問數(shù): 1279
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- 被引次數(shù): 0
出版歷程
- 收稿日期: 2015-01-27
- 修回日期: 2015-06-23
- 刊出日期: 2015-10-19

Access Control Based Hypervisor Non-control Data Integrity Protection

Funds:

The National Science and Technology Major Project of China (2013JH00103)

摘要

摘要: 在虛擬化技術(shù)廣泛應(yīng)用的同時(shí)虛擬層的安全問題引起了國內(nèi)外研究人員的密切關(guān)注?，F(xiàn)有的虛擬機(jī)管理器(Hypervisor)完整性保護(hù)方法主要針對代碼和控制數(shù)據(jù)的完整性保護(hù)，無法抵御非控制數(shù)據(jù)攻擊；采用周期性監(jiān)控?zé)o法提供實(shí)時(shí)的非控制數(shù)據(jù)完整性保護(hù)。針對現(xiàn)有方法的不足，該文提出了基于UCON的Hypervisor非控制數(shù)據(jù)完整性保護(hù)模型UCONhi。該模型在非控制數(shù)據(jù)完整性保護(hù)需求的基礎(chǔ)上簡化了UCON模型，繼承了UCON模型的連續(xù)性和易變性實(shí)現(xiàn)非控制數(shù)據(jù)的實(shí)時(shí)訪問控制。根據(jù)攻擊樣例分析攻擊者和攻擊對象確定主客體減少安全策略，提高了決策效率；并基于ECA描述UCONhi安全策略，能夠有效地決策非控制數(shù)據(jù)訪問合法性。在Xen系統(tǒng)中設(shè)計(jì)并實(shí)現(xiàn)了相應(yīng)的原型系統(tǒng)Xen-UCONhi，通過實(shí)驗(yàn)評測Xen-UCONhi的有效性和性能。結(jié)果表明，Xen-UCONhi能夠有效阻止針對虛擬機(jī)管理器的攻擊，且性能開銷在10%以內(nèi)。
- 虛擬機(jī)管理器 /
- 非控制數(shù)據(jù) /
- 使用控制 /
- 完整性保護(hù) /
- 事件條件行為
Abstract: With the widely spread of virtualization technology, the security problems of virtual layer have attracted the close attention of domestic and foreign researchers at the same time. Existing virtual machine monitor (or Hypervisor) integrity protection methods mainly focus on code and control data integrity protection, and can not resist the non-control data attacks; using periodic monitoring can not provide real-time non-control data integrity protection. According to the deficiencies of the existing methods, Hypervisor non-control data integrity protection model UCONhi is proposed based on Usage CONtral (UCON). The model simplifies the UCON model according to the needs of the non-control data integrity protection, inheriting the continuity and mutability of UCON model to realize real-time access control of non-control data. The attacker and the attacked object are analyzed to determine the subjects and objects and reduce the security policies according to the attacking samples, and UCONhi security policies are described based on ECA, which can effectively decide the legality of non-control data access. A prototype system Xen-UCONhi is designed and implemented based on Xen system, and the effectiveness and performance overhead of Xen-UCONhi are evaluated by comprehensive experiments. The results show that Xen-UCONhi can effectively prevent attacks against Hypervisor with less than 10% performance overhead.
- Virtual Machine Monitor (Hypervisor) /
- Non-control data /
- Usage control /
- Integrity protection /
- Event condition action

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