基于Stackelberg博弈的WCDMA網(wǎng)絡(luò)收益最大化計(jì)費(fèi)的研究
On Revenue-Maximized Pricing for WCDMA Networks Based on Stackelberg Game
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摘要: 該文研究了在WCDMA網(wǎng)絡(luò)中如何選擇價格來最大化網(wǎng)絡(luò)收益.沒有采用擁塞相關(guān)的計(jì)費(fèi),而是對每個用戶有效傳輸?shù)膯挝煌掏铝渴杖」潭ǖ馁M(fèi)用,但每個用戶的傳輸速率是網(wǎng)絡(luò)擁塞和單位帶寬價格的函數(shù),并在此基礎(chǔ)上提出了用戶凈效用函數(shù).利用Stackelberg博弈,建模網(wǎng)絡(luò)與用戶之間的交互,即一方面網(wǎng)絡(luò)管理者設(shè)定價格,以便實(shí)現(xiàn)收益最大化,而用戶通過自優(yōu)化效用函數(shù)來尋找新的均衡點(diǎn)對此做出響應(yīng).本文提供了網(wǎng)絡(luò)收益與接納用戶數(shù)目的定量關(guān)系,并研究了網(wǎng)絡(luò)降低用戶傳輸速率以增大網(wǎng)絡(luò)容量和擁塞控制的經(jīng)濟(jì)動機(jī).Abstract: The problem that how to set the price to maximize revenue in WCDMA networks is investigated in this paper. Instead of adopting congestion pricing mechanism, this paper imposes fixed usage price on throughput of each user, which is assumed to be the function of network congestion and usage cost. Based on above assumptions, the net utility functions of users are provided and Stackelberg game is adopted to model the interaction between network and users. That is, network sets the price to maximize revenue, and in response to the price, users maximize their net utility functions to achieve equilibriums. The paper provides the quantitative relation between revenue and the number of admitted users, and infers that although, technically speaking, network can increase system capacity to admit more users through decreasing transmission rate of users, the network has no incentive to adopt this policy. Conversely, network has the incentive to pert＇arm congestion control.
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